Brentano psychology quotes in hindi

This paper seeks to define the main trends, arguments and problems regarding the question of method formulated by Twardowski and his students. In this regard, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, I situate Brentano’s project of descriptive psychology within the context of disputes in the school of Twardowski concerning the method of both psychology and phenomenology, arguing that descriptive-psychological analysis was dominant in this respect. Second, the study explores the notion of eidetic phenomenology, as founded on a methodological procedure, which supposed to guarantee infallibility of its descriptions. To show this, I first reconstruct Brentano’s concept of descriptive psychology, its object, its method and aims. Second, I track the changes and reinterpretations provided by Twardowski in his view of descriptive-psychological analysis. Third, I explore Witwicki’s and Bandrowski’s—both early students of Twardowski—discussions of the descriptive approach. I try to show that the former accepted psychologism, while the latter overcame it by means of logical analysis. Fourth, I suggest that the only student of Twardowski who renounced the Brentanian method was Ingarden, who developed eidetic phenomenology. Finally, I present Blaustein’s—one of the last students of Twardowski—reappraisal of descriptive psychology and his critique of Ingarden’s method. This controversy over the method of descriptive psychology reveals how one can situate Twardowski’s legacy within early ...

In this book the author examines three aspects of Franz Brentano’s early philosophical endeavor. Part I is concerned with Brentano’s dissertation on the manifold meanings of “being” in relation to Martin Heidegger’s philosophical endeavor. Part II is an elaboration on Brentano’s project initiated in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), [1] whereas Part III (the final part) is particularly concerned with the relation between Brentano and Edmund Husserl with respect to the analysis of imagination. All of these parts are of considerable interest to the historian of philosophy and psychology of the late nineteenth century. In recent decades it has become undeniably obvious that Brentano was one of the most influential philosophers in the twentieth century and indeed continues to be of great interest in our time. Phenomenology in particular exhibits his influence, primarily because Husserl developed his analysis of consciousness out of the descriptive psychology that he had learned from Brentano’s lectures (1884–1885). Moreover, Martin Heidegger repeatedly said that he was initially prompted to reflect on the question of Being through his youthful encounter with Brentano’s dissertation, a work that was written in 1862. Parts I and III are accordingly of interest to a broad range of scholars and philosophers, especially in connection with phenomenology or the so-called phenomenological movement. As the present reviewer is much more competent to examine Parts II an...

Husserl often pays tribute to his teacher Brentano for having opened the path towards phenomenology. However, the praise is systematically followed by a criticism: Brentano failed to draw all the consequences from his ground-breaking rediscovery of intentionality, and remained stuck in inadequate psychological research. For Husserl, there are three ways to study mental acts: empirical, eidetic, and transcendental. What is objected to Brentano is his adherence to empirical psychology. Husserl himself focuses on the second and third levels. It is clear that Brentano never entered into transcendental considerations. However, it seems also clear that he was doing eidetic-like research in psychology in a way similar to Husserl. In the paper, I first present Husserl’s criticism of empirical and, thus, Brentanian psychology. I then turn to Brentano’s and the psychology of his heirs and try to show that Husserl’s criticism is unjustified. In the course of the discussion, I treat the crucial epistemological question of eidetic vs empirical knowledge, both in Husserl and in Brentano. Keywords • Edmund Husserl • Franz Brentano • Eidetic knowledge • Empirical knowledge • Psychology However, there is one exception, namely, the studies of Brentano’s psychology made by Marek, who not only draws attention to the fact that Brentano’s descriptive psychology contains definitional knowledge, but also explains the nature of this kind of knowledge by referring to elements of Brentano’s epistemo...

Franz Brentano (1838–1917) is famous for arguing in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) that intentionality—being directed toward something—is the mark of the mental. Brentano used that conception not only for distinguishing mental from physical phenomena, but also for developing a classification of mental phenomena. If intentionality is a fundamental feature of any mental act, Brentano argues, differences in the way mental phenomena are directed toward something constitute differences in kind between mental acts. Judgements are one of the three basic kinds of intentional phenomena with which Brentano deals at great length in his Psychology. That is not to say, however, that Brentano’s theory of judgement is just concerned with psychological issues. Brentano also aims to show how an experience of judging, specifically the experience of judging correctly, can provide us with a basis for grasping concepts like existence, truth, and logical inference. Brentano’s investigation of the mental act of judgement promises therefore to advance logic, epistemology, and ultimately metaphysics. Much of that work which Brentano started in his Psychology remained unfinished. It was left to his students to further flesh out his view by drawing on lecture notes, letters, and unpublished material from Brentano’s Nachlass. Whether all the claims that have been ascribed to Brentano in this literature actually belong to his theory remains a matter of debate in the literature. [ (...

Franz Clemens Honoratus Hermann Brentano (/brɛnˈtɑːnoʊ/; German: [bʀɛnˈtaːno]) was a philosopher, psychologist, and priest whose work strongly influenced not only students Franz Clemens Honoratus Hermann Brentano (/brɛnˈtɑːnoʊ/; German: [bʀɛnˈtaːno]) was a philosopher, psychologist, and priest whose work strongly influenced not only students

Franz Clemens Honoratus Hermann Brentano (1838–1917) was born into a distinguished German family of Italian origin. His second Christian name he inherited from his godfather, the famous poet Clemens Brentano. Brentano’s academic studies were centered around philosophy and theology. In 1862, he received his doctorate from Tübingen University with a dissertation entitled Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles ( 1862; On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, 1981 ). He became a Catholic priest two years later, and in 1866 he received the venia legendi at Würzburg University after completing his Habilitationsschrift, Die Psychologie des Aristoteles (PA, 1867; The Psychology of Aristotle, 1977). Keywords • Correct Preference • Mental Phenomenon • Correct Judgment • Logical Part • Ethical Knowledge These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves. Primary Sources • Brentano, Franz. Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen. Ed. Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand. Bern: Francke, 1952; rpt. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1977. • Brentano, Franz. Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1911. • Brentano, Franz. Aristotle and His World View. Trans. Rolf George and Roderick Chisholm. Berkeley: Univeristy of California Press, 1978. • Brentano, Franz. Deskriptive Psychologie. Ed. Roderick M. Chisholm and Wilhelm Baumgartner. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1982. • Brentan...