Pakistan nuclear test

In light of A.Q. Khan’s death on Sunday, the following is an adaptation from the 2008 book Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis . A.Q. Khan, who died on Oct. 10 of COVID-19 at age 85, is celebrated in Pakistan as a national hero who built the country’s nuclear bomb program. Internationally, though, he became infamous not as a nuclear scientist but as a nuclear smuggler—including playing a key role in boosting North Korea’s weapons program. As the head of Khan Research Laboratories, A.Q. Khan presided over his own nuclear fiefdom, which in the late 1980s and early ’90s spearheaded Pakistan’s development of highly enriched uranium. In 1998, Pakistan carried out a successful test of a nuclear bomb. Yet, confronted with the nuclear prowess of its neighbor and rival India, Pakistan still urgently needed a missile to deliver its bomb, and it was looking for a shortcut to avoid having to develop one on its own. His role as the “father of Pakistan’s atomic weapons program” turned Khan into a national hero. It also emboldened him to embark on a new path: secretly selling nuclear technology, know-how, and equipment to other countries. Khan began his enterprise in the late 1980s by selling centrifuges, blueprints, and other components to Iran. He would also eventually approach Iraq and Syria, and by the new millennium his client list had expanded to include Libya and North Korea. It is widely believed that a visit to Pyongyang by Pakistani Prime Minister Bena...

The Pakistan Army on May 28 observed the 24th anniversary of the country's nuclear tests and said it established a “credible minimum nuclear deterrence” and restored the "balance of power" in the region. Both the Pakistan Army and Foreign Office issued separate statements to mark the 24th anniversary of the May 28, 1998 nuclear tests, codenamed 'Yaum-e-Takbeer' (The day of greatness). Pakistan carried out the tests after “Armed Forces pay tribute to all those who worked selflessly, stayed steadfast against all odds and made this possible,” it said. Separately, the Foreign Office (FO) said the tests not only demonstrated the resolve of the Pakistani nation to safeguard Pakistan’s territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, but also the desire to preserve strategic balance in South Asia. “Pakistan is committed to the promotion of an environment of peace and stability in South Asia, while preserving its capability to ward off aggression or adventurism in any form,” it said. It added that threats to strategic stability in South Asia underscore the importance of Pakistan’s proposal for Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) which provides for measures for the resolution of outstanding issues, including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, nuclear and missile restraints; and conventional balance. Pokhran II, twenty years later Pakistan is a partner in international efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime based on the principles of non-discrimination and equa...

(Stockholm, 12 June 2023) The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) today launches its annual assessment of the state of armaments, disarmament and international security. A key finding of SIPRI Yearbook 2023 is that the number of operational nuclear weapons started to rise as countries’ long-term force modernization and expansion plans progressed. Read this press release in Catalan ( SIPRI Yearbook 2023 on world nuclear forces. Nuclear arsenals being fortified around the world The nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel—continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals and several deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems in 2022. Of the total global inventory of an estimated 12 512 warheads in January 2023, about 9576 were in military stockpiles for potential use— 86 more than in January 2022 (see the table below). Of those, an estimated 3844 warheads were deployed with missiles and aircraft, and around 2000—nearly all of which belonged to Russia or the USA—were kept in a state of high operational alert, meaning that they were fitted to missiles or held at airbases hosting nuclear bombers. Russia and the USA together possess almost 90 per cent of all nuclear weapons. The sizes of their respective nuclear arsenals (i.e. useable warheads) seem to have remained relatively stable in 2022, although transparency re...

New Documents Cite A. Q. Khan’s Lead Role in Pakistani “Shopping Expeditions” for Nuclear Supplies U.S. Officials Discussed “Brutal” Possibility that “Some Other Country” Might Destroy Pakistani Nuclear Plants The Discovery of Pakistan’s Secret Nuclear Program: Implications for U.S. Policy, 1978-1979 CIA photo of PINSTECH (the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology), the site of Pakistan's then-secret “New Labs” plutonium reprocessing facility. This photo from 1978 shows the looming reactor exhaust tower with the reactor dome behind it, all shrouded in mist. For clear photos of the reactor, see the Physics Today Pakistan’s President, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, circa 1971, a year before he directed scientists to undertake a nuclear weapons project. During 1973-1977, he served as Prime Minister until a military coup overthrew him. This photo was used by Bhutto to fulfill autograph requests, for display in public buildings, and other purposes. (Source: Career Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel (1920-2001) served as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from June 1977 to July 1981. Beginning in the fall of 1978, he repeatedly asked the State Department for authority to lodge a demarche expressing concerns about Pakistan’s secret enrichment program. (Source: National Archives, Still Pictures Division, RG 59-S0, box 8) Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, the President’s special representative for nonproliferation matters, and U.S. representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1977-1980, meet...

Pakistan developed nuclear weapons outside of the NPT and is believed to possess an arsenal of about 165 nuclear warheads , as of 2022 . Pakistan is expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country and developing new delivery systems, including development of the sea-based leg of a nuclear triad and speculated development of an ICBM. Pakistan’s nuclear program has largely been driven by its regional rivalry with India since India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974. Numerous Pakistani entities and individuals have been sanctioned by the U.S. for nonproliferation violations, though many are still believed to be actively exporting nuclear weapons technologies and know-how. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is a source of security concern given its political instability and robust extremist groups in the country, though Pakistani and U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that Pakistan’s nuclear assets are secure. Contents Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards Nuclear Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices • The Nuclear Arsenal, an Overview • Delivery Systems • Fissile Material • Proliferation Record • Nuclear Doctrine Biological Weapons Chemical Weapons Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities • Bilateral Talks with India • Nuclear Security Summits • Conference on Disarmament (CD) Signed Ratified Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty --- --- --- --- Convention on the Physica...

This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. Distribution and use of this material are governed by our Subscriber Agreement and by copyright law. For non-personal use or to order multiple copies, please contact Dow Jones Reprints at 1-800-843-0008 or visit www.djreprints.com. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB896356796170481500 Pakistan's decision to defy world pressure and match India with a series of nuclear-bomb tests Thursday threatens to hammer the fragile Pakistani economy and push the two impoverished South Asian enemies toward a destabilizing arms race. Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8 Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. Distribution and use of this material are governed by our Subscriber Agreement and by copyright law. For non-personal use or to order multiple copies, please contact Dow Jones Reprints at 1-800-843-0008 or visit www.djreprints.com.